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NOTES
UNDERPRODUCTIVE TRUST ASSETS IN NEW YORK
When an income trust is established, two interests are cre-
ated-that of the income beneficiary and that of the remainderman.
It is the duty of the trustee to strike a fair balance between these
interests in his investment of the trust assets.' This fair balance
involves the production of income on the one hand,2 and the
preservation of the integrity of the trust corpus on the other.
When a portion of the trust corpus is unproductive of income,
there sometimes arises a duty in the trustee to convert the unpro-
ductive asset into an income producing asset--one which would
maintain this fair balance.3
'See Redfield v. Critchley, 252 App. Div. 568, 573, 300 N.Y. Supp. 305,
310 (1st Dep't 1937), aff'd, 277 N.Y. 336, 14 N.E.2d 377 (1938); In the
Matter of Dwight, 204 Misc. 204, 128 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (sur-
charge granted for breach of that duty); In re Simpson's Will, 33 N.Y.S2d
614, 616 (Surr. Ct. 1942) (dictum); 3 SCOr, TRUSTS §232 (2d ed. 1956).
From this duty of impartiality flows the duty to convert and reinvest un-
productive property. RESTAT ENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §232, comment b
(1959). The trustee may easily violate the impartiality rule through im-
prudent investments. See, e.g., In the Matter of Young, 249 App. Div. 495,
293 N.Y. Supp. 97 (2d Dep't), aff'd nem., 274 N.Y. 543, 10 N.E.2d 541
(1937); In the Matter of Flint, 240 App. Div. 217, 269 N.Y. Supp. 470
(2d Dep't 1934), aff'd mere., 266 N.Y. 607, 195 N.E. 221 (1935); cf. In re
Woodin's Estate, 118 .Y.S.2d 465 (Surr. Ct 1952).
2 See In the Matter of Sinclaire, 201 Misc. 189, 191, 104 N.Y.S.2d 826,
828 (Surr. Ct. 1951); 3 Sco-rr, TRUSTS § 240, at 1875 (2d ed. 1956).
3 See In the Matter of Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 255-56, 97 N.E.2d 888,
892 (1951). While the income beneficiary would object to unproductive or
underproductive assets as part of the corpus, the remainderman often is
more than content with their retention. His complaints will be heard, how-
ever, when "wasting assets" are procured or retained by the trustee.
Wasting assets are "such interests as terminate or necessarily depreciate in
course of time either because of the nature of the interest or because of the
character of the subject matter of the interest." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND),
TRUSTS § 239, comment a (1959). Common examples of wasting assets are
annuities, royalties and patents, exhaustible deposits of natural resources, and
various term interests. 4 PowE.LL, REAL PROPERTY fi 555, at 345-46 (1954).
In these instances, rather than the income beneficiary receiving too meager
a return, he is receiving too much-and it is at the expense of the remainder-
man whose interest is being depleted. In such an instance the trustee is under
a duty to sell the wasting asset and. reinvest the proceeds in assets benefiting
both parties or, in the alternative, to retain the asset and amortize or
apportion the receipts. In the Matter of Will of Haldeman, 208 Misc. 419,
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It often happens that an immediate conversion is either in-
advisable or impossible, with the result that the sale is delayed.
4
During this interim period no income is produced, and upon the
ultimate sale, the income beneficiary may seek compensation for
this lost income by demanding an apportionment of the proceeds
between income and remainder. 5 The apportionment, if granted,
would allocate to the income beneficiary that amount which would
have been earned had the conversion and reinvestment been
immediate.6
143 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Surr. Ct. 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 239(1959).
However, this rule is not rigid, yielding readily to the testator's contrary
intention as indicated by the will or by the circumstances surrounding its
execution. See In the Matter of Estate of Goetzinger, 12 Misc. 2d 197,
176 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Surr. Ct. 1958); In the Matter of Estate of Hopkins,
171 Misc. 910, 14 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Surr. Ct. 1939). The circumstances relied
upon as indicative of such contrary intent are the same as those relied upon
to find an intent to have unproductive property converted. Compare In re
Bruen's Estate, 83 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Surr. Ct. 1948) (wasting asset), with
In re Brown's Estate, 65 N.Y.S.2d 624, 628-29 (Surr. Ct. 1943) (unproductive
asset).
4 See In the Matter of Pennock, 285 N.Y. 475, 484-86, 35 N.E.2d 177,
181 (1941), where the court discusses both the inability to convert the un-
productive assets and the inadvisability of an immediate conversion. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 231, comment c (1959) for circumstances
bearing upon the advisability of a delay.
5 Great impetus was given to the apportionment theory by the depression.
See Skilton, The Rights of Successive Beneficiaries in Unproductive Trust
Assets Not Bearing Interest, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 241 (1941); see, e.g., In the
Matter of Estate of Pelcyger, 157 Misc. 913, 938, 285 N.Y. Supp. 723, 749
(Surr. Ct. 1936).
6Relying on the leading case of Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 581,
67 N.E. 658 (1903), the New York Court of Appeals verbalized the ap-
portionment formula as follows: "Take a sum, which invested [when the
duty to sell arose] . . . at such a rate, as the trustees would probably have
received would amount on the day of the sale to the net amount received.
That sum is principal. The balance is income." Furniss v. Cruikshank,
230 N.Y. 495, 508-09, 130 N.E. 625, 629, modified mere., 231 N.Y. 550,
132 N.E. 884 (1921). See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 241 (1959).
A different approach is used when granting compound rather than simple
interest from the date of the duty to sell. The two methods expressed
mathematically are found in 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §287, at
289-90 (1948).
The Uniform Principal and Income Act differs from the Restatement
formula in two important aspects. It sets the rate of return at 5% rather
than the "current rate" and designates one year from the receipt of
the property by the trustee or from the time of unproductiveness,
whichever is less, as the presumed time at which the duty arises.
The mathematics of the rule is, however, the same. Compare RESTATEMENT
(SE OND), TRUSTS §241 (1959), with UNIFORM PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT§11.The method of apportionment employed in cases which involve salvage
operations on defaulted mortgages is unique. See 3 Scor, TRUSTS § 241.3A(2d ed. 1956); Skilton, The Rights of Successive Beneficiaries in Un-
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In a recent New York case, Estate of Sheridan,7 the estate
of an income beneficiary, who had been a co-trustee, sought an
apportionment of the proceeds from the delayed sale of low yield
common stock. Although in prior cases a duty to sell totally
unproductive trust assets had often been found, the question of
the existence of a duty to sell low yield or underproductive assets
-assets which produce income below the current or normal rate
of return-was unresolved. In addition, the New York courts
have indicated an apparent reluctance to extend the theory of
apportionment from realty to personalty. Hence, a second question
arose concerning whether there should be an apportionment of
the proceeds from the sale of common stock. Initially, the Sur-
rogate's Court granted the apportionment. However, on reargu-
ment the original opinion was withdrawn, and the apportionment
denied on the ground that an income beneficiary, when a co-
fiduciary, is estopped from asserting a breach of duty.8  The
disposal of the case left the implication, albeit a weak one, that
had the estoppel not existed, the apportionment of the proceeds
of the underproductive common stock might have been granted.
In the light of this possibility, it is the purpose of this note
to inspect these problems, namely, when and how the duty to
convert arises; what are the effects of failing to convert as soon
as the duty arises; and, upon the conversion, when does the right
to apportionment exist.
Duty to Convert
The finding of a duty to sell a particular trust asset is the
essential first step toward the allowance of an apportionment of
the proceeds. From the duty to convert, coupled with a justifiable
delay in the conversion, the apportionment will normally flow.9
Nothing more will be required before the right to apportionment
will be granted, although the presence of certain circumstances,
to be discussed subsequently, may bar the relief. For this reason
the duty to sell and the consequent right to apportionment are
often difficult to separate, the courts seldom dealing with the
questions individually.
productive Trust Assets Bearing Interest, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 378, 390-94(1941).
The question of whether the income or principal account will bear
the carrying charges of the unproductive property is closely aligned to the
apportionment question. See 3 ScoTr, op. cit. supra § 233.4.
7146 N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1961, p. 6, col. 8 (Surr. Ct., N.Y. County),
opinion withdrawn on reargument, 222 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Surr. Ct. 1961).8 In re Estate of Sheridan, 222 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
94 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 11556, at 356 (1954).
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The ascertainment of the duty to sell is basically a construc-
tion problem, and realizing that no two wills, with their surround-
ing circumstances, are likely to be identical, the value of precedent
is diminished.10
The powers and duties of the trustee flow from the instru-
ment creating the trust, and if the instrument itself expressly
commands the sale of an asset, a duty to sell exists." By the
same token, if the settlor instructs that an asset be retained,
normally there will not be a duty to sell. 12  But where the instru-
ment lacks explicit directions, i.e., where no specific duty to sell
or retain is imposed, mere discretionary power to sell or retain
being granted, the difficulties arise. To a greater or lesser degree
in this situation, the settlor's implied intent must be relied upon.
According to the Restatement of Trusts, the existence of a
trust creating successive interests coupled with the unproductive-
ness of an asset, gives rise to a duty to sell. These circumstances
standing alone are considered a sufficient basis for assuming an
10 See Furniss v. Cruikshank, 230 N.Y. 495, 505, 130 N.E. 625, 628,
modified iner., 231 N.Y. 550, 132 N.E. 884 (1921) ; In the Matter of Lott,
251 App. Div. 333, 335, 296 N.Y. Supp. 43, 45-46 (2d Dep't 1937).
11 Fraser v. The Trustee of the Gen. Assembly of the United Presbyterian
Church, 124 N.Y. 479, 26 N.E. 1034 (1891); In the Matter of Estate of
Schuster, 175 Misc. 1072, 27 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Surr. Ct. 1941); In the Matter
of Estate of Cohn, 153 Misc. 757, 276 N.Y. Supp. 59 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
See Haggerty, Some Aspects of the Obligations of New York Fiduciaries
With Respect to the Making and Retention of Investments, II, 16 FORDHAm
L. Rxv. 153, 163-64 (1947).
The same problems would appear to exist with regard to whether the
trust is inter vivos or testamentary. See In re Cantagalli, 92 N.Y.S.2d 829
(Sup. Ct. 1949), quoting Rockland-Rockport Lime Co. v. Leary, 203 N.Y.
469, 480, 97 N.E. 43, 46 (1911). "The conversion usually becomes effective
at the date of the instrument expressing the intention, if a deed or contract,
and if a will, at the date of testator's death."
12 See In the Matter of Satterwhite, 262 N.Y. 339, 186 N.E. 857 (1933).
If it is in the best interests of the estate, the court can grant the power
to sell where no power is given. In re Minden's Will, 138 N.Y.S.2d 340
(Surr. Ct. 1954) (construing N.Y. SURa. CT. AcT §250-a). This power
can also be granted where there are express directions to retain the asset.
In the Matter of Roche, 233 App. Div. 236, 251 N.Y. Supp. 347 (4th Dep't
1931), modified, 259 N.Y. 458, 182 N.E. 82 (1932) ; In the Matter of Estate
of Wander, 141 Misc. 584, 252 N.Y. Supp. 813 (Surr. Ct. 1931); In the
Matter of Estate of Pulitzer, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y. Supp. 87 (Surr. Ct.
1931), aff'd mem., 237 App. Div. 808, 260 N.Y. Supp. 975 (1st Dep't 1932).
The court in Pulitzer also indicated that there may be a duty to sell the
asset if it appears likely to become worthless. Id. at 577, 249 N.Y. Supp.
at 91. Although a duty to sell may arise regardless of the direction to
retain, such direction would at least negate any intention to apportion upon
the sale. The court can also grant the power to invest beyond the limitations
set forth in the trust instrument when the directions therein are impossible




intention to allow an apportionment, and on them the duty to
convert is predicated. 3 This assumption of a duty from the
successive interests plus unproductiveness has been employed on
occasion in New York.14 However, the weight of authority in
this state is to the contrary,15 and generally more is required. At
times little more is required, the duty being assumed upon the
showing of close familial relationships between the settlor and
the income beneficiaries. 16  But the tendency of the New York
courts has been to look to all the circumstances, and to find a
duty only if the intention of the testator to exact one might rea-
sonably be imputed.17 This imputation of the settlor's intent was
stretched to its limit in In the Matter of Rowland.'8 In that case,
the trust assets were productive at the death of the settlor, be-
coming unproductive subsequent to his demise. The court held
that had the settlor foreseen the future unproductivity he would
have intended a duty to convert. 9 It was pointed out in In the
Matter of Estate of Knox exactly how close the Rowland decision
verged on adopting the Restatement rule which finds the duty to
convert in all cases of unproductivity.2 0
Although the tendency is to liberalize the treatment of the
income beneficiary through the munificent finding of a duty to
13 RESTATEmENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §240 (1959). "In some jurisdictions,
this development appears to have gone so far that nothing but a clear
testamentary expression to the contrary will change the procedure of charging
the burden arising because of unproductivity of an asset to corpus and
thus favoring the life beneficiary." In re Johnson's Will, 73 N.Y.S.2d 621,
626 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
'4 In the Matter of Will of Rosenzweig, 4 Misc. 2d 142, 144, 148 N.Y.S.
2d 371, 372 (Surr. Ct. 1955), aff'd inem., 7 App. Div.'2d 969, 183 N.Y.S.2d
992 (1st Dep't 1959).
15 Furniss v. Cruikshank, supra note 10, at 501, 130 N.E. at 626; Spencer
v. Spencer, 219 N.Y. 459, 466, 114 N.E. 849, 850-51 (1916); Lawrence v.
Littlefield, 215 N.Y. 561, 582, 109 N.E. 611, 617-18 (1915); see DODGE AND
SULLIVAN, ESTATE ADmINISTRATION AND ACCOUNTING 438-39 (1940).10 See In the Matter of Will of Shepard, 186 Misc. 564, 59 N.Y.S.2d 803
(Surr. Ct 1945) ; In the Matter of Estate of Knox, 163 Misc. 264, 296 N.Y.
Supp. 745 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
17 Authorities cited note 15 supra.
18273 N.Y. 100, 6 N.E.2d 393 (1937). See In the Matter of Jackson,
258 N.Y. 281, 291, 179 N.E. 496, 500 (1932), for its liberalizing language
in this area.
19 In the Matter of Rowland, 273 N.Y. 100, 109, 6 N.E2d 393, 396
(1937).
20 163 Misc. 264, 268, 296 N.Y. Supp. 745, 749 (Surr. Ct. 1937). The
Rowland rationale was followed in In re Craft's Estate, 3 N.Y.S.2d 377(Surr. Ct. 1938), and applied to carrying charges in In the Matter of Estate
of Reese, 173 Misc. 510, 18" N.Y.S.2d 125 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
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convert,21 the courts have not embraced the broad Restatement
position.
The question in New York still remains . . . whether the . .. [settlor] has
disclosed an intent to command a sale of unproductive property. . . . [This
intention] must be gathered from the language of the will, the circumstances
surrounding its execution, the relationship of the testator to the object of
his bounty, a consideration of the nature of the trust property and its extent
in relation to the other assets of the trust.2 2
Whether the duty to sell is assumed, as in the Restatement,
or inferred, as in the majority of New York cases, 23 it is made
to rest upon the settlor's intention. The difference in approach
seems to be the readiness with which a court will find such an
intention.
The New York cases which have found a duty to convert
have all involved trust assets which were totally unproductive of
income. Although the Restatement,24 the Uniform Principal and
Income Act 25 and text writers 20 approve the inclusion of under-
productive property in the scope of this duty to convert, no New
York case( has clearly reached this conclusion.2 7  On the other
hand, the INTew York case law has not rejected the possibility of
an intention being found to impose a duty to convert underpro-
ductive assets. Indeed, the theory employed in New York would
seem to warrant their inclusion, since the intention that is found,
as expressed by a number of leading New York cases, is not
merely that there be a sale of totally unproductive trust assets
but rather that "a provision of income for a life beneficiary shall
[not] be rendered nugatory . ,, 28
Applying this test, which looks to the intended benefit to the
life tenant rather than to the degree of productivity of the asset,
21 See, e.g., In re Johnson's Will, 73 N.Y.S.2d 621, 626 (Surr. Ct. 1947).22 1n re Brown's Estate, 65 N.Y.S2d 624, 628-29 (Surr. Ct. 1943).23 Professor Powell views the New York position as involving "circuitous
reasoning," which requires "the setting up of an unnecessary and irrelevant
prerequisite, [the duty,] and . . . the finding of its presence by a strained
bit of construction." 4 PowE.L, REAL PROPERTY 11556, at 358 (1954).24 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 240, comment b (1959).
25UNIFORM PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 11(1).
264 BoERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 829, at 305 (1948); 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§ 240, at 1876 (2d ed. 1956).
27A distinction must be made between underproductive and partially
unproductive, the latter term being applied to a trust corpus which, as a
whole, is productive, but which contains an asset which of itself is totally
unproductive.
28 Laurence v. Littlefield, 215 N.Y. 561, 569, 109 N.E. 611, 613 (1915);
see In the Matter of Jackson, 258 N.Y. 281, 289, 179 N.E. 496, 499 (1932);
Furniss v. Cruikshank, 230 N.Y. 495, 500, 130 N.E. 625, 626, modified nem.,
231 N.Y. 550, 132 N.E. 884 (1921); Spencer v. Spencer, 219 N.Y. 459, 467,
114 N.E. 849, 851 (1916).
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it can be seen that trust assets need not be totally unproductive
in order to violate the testator's scheme. Retention of assets
returning a small fraction of one per cent would be as far beyond
the settlor's wishes as would retention of assets producing nothing.
If the settlor did not intend a conversion and apportionment of
only those assets which have become totally unproductive, it be-
comes necessary to determine at what point he did intend a sale.
Two other possibilities remain: the intention that there be a sale
of assets producing any amount less than the normal return, or
the intention that there be a sale at some other point of
underproductiveness between total unproductivity and normal
productivity.
. Whether an intention will be imputed to the settlor to re-
quire the sale of an asset unproductive to any degree, i. e., producing
any amount less than the normal return, or whether a line will
be drawn, above which the settlor will not be deemed to have
intended a conversion, involves an inquiry into formidable theo-
retical and practical problems.29 In theory, it is difficult to fix a
point between total unproductivity and normal productivity at
which it can be said that the settlor intended to require a sale.
Yet the tendency to grasp the normal rate of return as that which
is intended must be tempered by the strong practical considerations
which bear upon this decision. Serious questions can arise con-
cerning both the actual per cent return being earned" and the
29 The period for which an apportionment is allowed extends from the
time at which the duty to sell arises to the date of the reinvestment in
income-producing assets. It is far more difficult to designate a point of
decline in an asset's return at which a duty to sell is intended than it is
to ascertain the intended time to sell a totally unproductive asset. And yet,
when finding the time at which the duty to sell a totally unproducive asset
had arisen, the courts have not been in agreement. As stated by Surrogate
Delehanty, "there is no established rule as to that time"; he cites cases
holding the effective date of the duty to be: (1) one year after the trusts
were constituted, (2) at the end of three years (the time expressed by the
settlor), and (3) the date of death of the settlor. In the Matter of Estate
of Andreini, 165 Misc. 297, 300, 300 N.Y. Supp. 1224, 1229 (Surr. Ct.
1937); 4 PowE.L, REAL PROPERTY 1556, at 361 (1954). One year from
the issuance of letters has also been chosen. In the Matter of Estate of
Clarke, 166 Misc. 807, 3 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Surr. Ct. 1938). Real property
used as a residence is not unproductive. In the Matter of Estate of Brewster,
148 Misc. 390, 393, 266 N.Y. Supp. 573, 576-77 (Surr. Ct. 1932), modified,
246 App. Div. 190, 283 N.Y. Supp. 706 (4th Dep't 1935). It becomes un-
productive, and the duty to sell arises, when the residential use ceases.
In re Fahnestock's Estate, 70 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd 7nem., 273
App. Div. 747, 75 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd mnem., 267 N.Y. 647,
82 N.E2d 38 (1949).
-
0
"[A]n estate may become unproductive either because the income has
decreased while the value has remained constant, or because the value has
increased and the income remained constant." Webster Realty Co. v. Delano,
135 App. Div. 488, 493, 120 N.Y. Supp. 440, 443 (1st Dep't 1909).
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normal or. average return possible under the existing market con-
ditions.31 As a result, the trustee would initially be confronted
with a troublesome task in determining when an asset is, in fact,
producing less than the normal return. In addition, if the pro-
ductivity borders on the normal return, the asset must be con-
stantly attended in fear of its earnings falling unnoticed, below
the proper productivity. It is clear, then, that the demands of a
''normal return" requirement greatly increase the burdens of
trusteeship.32 Consequently, the adoption of this test, which appears
to be as a practical matter unworkable, would be highly inadvisable.
Thus, each of the alternatives offered is, to some degree,
objectionable. A sale upon nothing less than total unproductivity
is clearly contrary to the settlor's intention; a sale of any asset
which produces less than the normal return presents insurmount-
able practical difficulties; a sale at some point of underproductive-
ness between these (two poles presents the further problem of
clearly fixing that point.
Two approaches have been made to the problem of designat-
ing the conversion point between total unproductivity and pro-
ductivity commensurate with the normal return. The Restate-
1nent 33 and some text writers 34 have adopted what is essentially
a "fairness" test. Under this, there will be a duty to sell, and
if proper, to apportion the proceeds from assets which are "sub-
stantially unproductive." The line of substantial unproductive-
ness is said to lie somewhere between totally unprodtictive and
"somewhat less than the ordinary return. . . .,
The Uniform Principal and Income Act, on the other hand,
31 See In the Matter of Estate of Pelcyger, 157 Misc. 913, 937-38, 285N.Y. Supp. 723, 748-49 (Surr. Ct. 1936), for objections to the concept of
an "average!' rate of return. The rate of 4% was deemed the current return
in some cases. Furniss v. Cruikshank, mpra note 28; In the Matter of
Estate of Hovelaque, 176 Misc. 869, 29 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Surr. Ct. 1940);
In the Matter of Estate of Clarke, 166 Misc. 807, 3 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Surr.
Ct. 1938). A 3% return was employed in others. In the Matter of Sinclaire,
201 Misc. 189, 104 N.Y.S.2d. 826 (Surr. Ct. 1951); In re Johnson's Will,
73 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Surr. Ct. 1947). The 5% rate allowed in the Uniform
Principal and Income Act is not responsive to market conditions. See
UNIFORM PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 11 (2). Most common stocks yield less
than 5%. Flynn, Rising Tide of Interest in Income, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES
1236 (1959).
324 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 829, at 305 (1948). See the dis-
cussion of the surcharge remedy in text accompanying notes 39-45 infra.
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 232, comment b, 240 (1959). The
provision for wasting assets also allows the income beneficiary a "fair
return." Id. § 239, comment b.
34 4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 32; 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 240, at 1876 (2d ed.
1956).
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 240, comment b (1959); 3 SCOTT,
op. cit. supra note 34.
[ VOL. 36
NOTES
has arbitrarily set the requisite return at one per cent, below
which a duty to convert will arise.36
It can be seen that both these tests strike a middle ground,
denying the need for total unproductivity before a duty to convert
will arise, and yet rejecting, for practical reasons, an assumption
that the settlor intended that the normal return be produced.
Some of the practical difficulties which prompted the rejection
of the current return as being that which the settlor intended,
thereby giving rise to a duty to convert assets producing less than
that amount, would appear to exist under the Uniform Act. By
setting a definite per cent return, the complex question of the
"normal rate of return" is perfunctorily bypassed. Many serious
issues which could conceivably arise concerning the actual amount
of income being produced by the contested asset have also been
resolved by the act in designating the market value or the fair
inventory value at the time the asset was acquired as the principal
upon which this one per cent return is based.3 7
However laudable this definiteness may be, the very definite-
ness of the actual numerical percentage undermines the discretion
normally granted the trustee. Stripped of this discretion, when
confronted with trust assets, the returns of which border on the
required one per cent, the trustee would be required to exercise
a good deal more attention than would ordinarily be warranted
by the circumstances. Professor Bogert's objection that the bur-
dens of trusteeship would be greatly multiplied would appear to
be particularly apt in this regard.38
Objection may also be leveled at the "substantially unpro-
ductive" test advocated by the Restatement. An exact definition
of this flexible and shifting standard is impossible, with the result
that it might easily be said to suffer from vagueness, However,
any criticism of this proposal must be made in the light of the
alternate solutions offered: finding the duty to convert (a) only
totally unproductive property; (b) any property producing less
than the "normal return"; (c) assets producing less than one per
cent. Each of these rules is either inequitable, impractical or too
rigid, and none allows the exercise of discretion.
As case law on the subject develops, the line of substantial
unproductiveness will be brought into sharper focus, removing the
objection of vagueness. Under these circumstances, New York
might profit by the adoption of a "substantially unproductive" test
3 6 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL & INCOME AcT § 11 (2).
37 Ibid. Compare this with Webster Realty Co. v. Delano, zsitpra note 30.
This act has been adopted, albeit with modifications, in twenty-two states.
4 PoWEL., REAL PROPERTY 1551, at 323 n.2 (1954).
38 4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 32.
19621
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in its determination of the time at which a duty to convert trust
assets arises.
Failure to Convert - Surcharge
From the general duty requiring the trustee to deal impartially
with the successive interests,"9 the duty to employ the trust funds
profitably naturally flows.40  "As a corollary to that general duty-to
employ the estate's assets profitably-there arises the further duty
to sell or convert unproductive assets and reinvest the proceeds." 41
Once a duty to sell the asset has been found to exist, the sale
may be delayed. This procrastination may be justifiable or the
result of the trustee's improvidence. In the latter instance, a sur-
charge may be imposed against the trustee to the extent of the
injury suffered as a result of the delay. If, however, justification
for the belated sale exists, the income beneficiary might still be
compensated for the income lost as a result of the delay by the
granting of an apportionment of the proceeds upon the sale. In
this instance, the income beneficiary is made whole at the expense
of the remainderman.
The justification for a delay in the sale is found in the normal
allowance of a reasonable time in which to effect the con-
version.42  This test of reasonableness ultimately revolves around the
criterion of prudence. A recognition of the trustee's difficult posi-
39 Redfield v. Critchley, 252 App. Div. 568, 573, 300 N.Y. Supp. 305, 310
(1st Dep't 1937), aff'd, 277 N.Y. 336, 14 N.E.2d 347 (1938); In the Matter
of Estate of Cohn, 153 Misc. 757, 276 N.Y. Supp. 59 (Surr. Ct. 1934)
(dictum); RESTATEMENT (SECoND), TRusTs §232, comment b (1959). The
line of impartiality may, at times, be difficult to draw. Compare In re
Kilmer's Will, 186 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Surr. Ct. 1959) (remainderman's request
for surcharge refused where tax free bonds benefited income but harmed
remainder), with In the Matter of Dwight, 204 Misc. 204, 128 N.Y.S2d
23 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (surcharge granted under similar facts).40 1n the Matter of Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 255, 97 N.E.2d 888, 892
(1951); In the Matter of Flint, 240 App. Div. 217, 226, 269 N.Y. Supp.
470, 480 (2d Dep't 1934), aff'd mem., 266 N.Y. 607, 195 N.E. 221 (1935).
In In re Soss' Estate, 71 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Surr. Ct. 1947), a surcharge was
granted where the trustee invested in 2% government bonds when he could
as easily have invested in 239 government bonds.
This duty to invest productively is not limited to the trustee, but can
be extended to administrators and executors. "[O]ne of the primary duties
of a fiduciary is to make productive the fund in his hands and not to keep
it 'laid up in a napkin."' In re Rathbone's Estate, 78 N.Y.S.2d 457, 460(Surr. Ct. 1947). See In re Kruger's Estate, 249 N.Y. Supp. 772 (Surr.
Ct. 1931) for a comprehensive collection of authority on this point.
41 In the Matter of Hubbell, supra note 40 at 256, 97 N.E.2d at 892.
42 See In the Matter of Clark, 257 N.Y. 132, 139, 177 N.E. 397, 399
(1931); In the Matter of Estate of Lazar, 139 Misc. 261, 262, 247 N.Y.




tion when required to sell on a declining market has led to the
granting of broad discretion in the determination of the proper
time to sell.43 However, if the delay is unreasonable and im-
prudent, the personal liability of surcharge will be imposed.44
The further one moves from totally unproductive property
with an unlimited market to substantially unproductive property
with a buyer's market or no market at all, the more vague and
undefined the duty to sell becomes, and consequently the harsher
the surcharge remedy when employed.
The Uniform Act has attempted to alleviate the burden of
immediate ascertainment of the duty by providing that the duty
to sell does not arise until one year after the income return on
trust assets has fallen below one per cent. 45 Although of unques-
tioned assistance to the harried trustee, this provision is at the
expense of the income beneficiary who will have lost the income
the settlor intended he receive for that year.
In contrast to the definite standard set forth in the Uniform
Act, the suggested test of substantial unproductivity is incapable
of exact definition. Thus, the adoption of this standard by New
York would impose upon the trustee a less-clearly defined duty
than would exist under a test which finds a duty to convert only
those assets which have become totally unproductive. In view of
this significant extension of the trustee's duty, it would appear
to be necessary that the present prudence requirements be relaxed
and the trustee's discretion extended, resulting in a less frequent
imposition of the surcharge remedy.
The Right to Apportionment
The first step toward the allowance of an apportionment is
to find a duty to convert the assets. As outlined above, various
points, ranging from total unproductivity to slightly less than
normal productivity, might be chosen as the point at which this
duty arises. Without regard to when the duty to sell arises, in
the last analysis the duty must be found to exist before there
can be an apportionment. Normally, upon the finding of the
4s re Lawrence's Estate, 116 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Surr. Ct. 1952); In re
Feinberg's Estate, 82 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Surr. Ct. 1948); see In the Matter of
Sinclaire, 201 Misc. 189, 191, 104 N.Y.S.2d 826, 828 (Surr. Ct. 1951); In re
Balch's Estate, 84 N.Y.S.2d 841, 845-46 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
441n the Matter of Hubbell, supra note 40, at 258-59, 97 N.E.2d at 894
(trustees guilty of gross negligence as a matter of law); In the Matter of
Garvin, 256 N.Y. 518, 177 N.E. 24 (1931) (executor surcharged); In the
Matter of Buck, 184 Misc. 29, 52 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Surr. Ct. 1944) (ad-
ministrator c.t.a. surcharged).4 5 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL & INcOME AcT §11(1). For a discussion of
the evaluation of the trust assets see text accompanying note 37 supra.
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duty to convert, the right to apportionment is secured without
more. Yet, totally apart from the productivity of the assets,
which bears only upon the duty to convert, the existence of
additional circumstances may operate to deny the right to the
apportionment.
It is possible, although unlikely, for the trust instrument to
indicate an intent to have a sale and reinvestment of the proceeds
of unproductive property, but not to have an apportionment of
the proceeds if the sale is delayed.46  In such a case the settlor's
intent would be followed, and no apportionment allowed.
Apportionment has been denied in other instances, however,
on the basis of a distinction in the character of the asset-whether
it is realty, the traditional context in which apportionment is
granted,47 or whether the asset is personalty.
The earliest nonrealty apportionment case in New York was
In the Matter of Estate of Clarke,48 involving an art collection
which constituted a major portion of the trust corpus. The court,
in allowing the apportionment of the proceeds, considered factors
relied upon in the unproductive realty cases-"the expression of
intent, the surrounding circumstances of the will, the close rela-
tionship of the beneficiaries, and . . . the magnitude of the asset
as compared with other assets in the estate." 49 However, the fact
that the case involved personalty prompted the court to exact a
further requirement-one of uniqueness. They stated that "no
general rule directing an apportionment should be made as to
ordinary personalty" 50 and grounded their allowance of the remedy
upon "the peculiar and distinctive character . . . [of the
asset] ." 51
In 1940, two years after having written the opinion in Clarke,
Surrogate Foley, in In the Matter of Estate of Hovelaque,52 ex-
tended the type of personalty in which apportionment would be
allowed to notes bearing no interest; but more important, he as-
sumed the intention to have an apportionment from the mere
creation of a trust for successive interests, in the absence of in-
dications of a contrary intent. No uniqueness test was applied,
the mere unproductiveness being sufficient. However, in the fol-
46 See 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 829, at 301 (1948); 3 Scurr,
TRUSTS § 241.2, at 1896-97 (2d ed. 1956).
47 See authorities cited note 15 supra.
48 166 Misc. 807, 811, 3 N.Y.S.2d 60, 64 (Surr. Ct. 1938).49 Id. at 812, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 65. Compare text accompanying note 22
supra.50 In the Matter of Estate of Clarke, 166 Misc. 807, 812, 3 N.Y.S.2d
60, 65 (Surr. Ct. 1938) (emphasis added).
51 Ibid.
52 176 Misc. 869, 29 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
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lowing year, the Court of Appeals in In the Matter of Pennock 53
affirmed the Clarke distinction by granting apportionment of a
unique chose in. action, disregarding the absence of uniqueness test
in Hovelaque.
In 1947, In re Ebbets' Will " refused apportionment of the
proceeds from the sale of unproductive stock in a closely held
corporation.5 5 The court stated:
[T]he cases in which apportionment [has] been decreed involved non-productive
. . . realty . . . choses-in-action and personalty of an unique character. No
case has been cited wherein common stock of a non-realty corporation has
been determined to be a proper subject of apportionment.5 6
In the same year, however, the proceeds from the settlement
of a claim were apportioned, the court relying upon the testator's
intent and the large proportion this asset bore to the entire estate.
No mention of a uniqueness requirement or realty-personalty dis-
tinction was made.57 This holding was shortly followed by one
which denied an apportionment of personalty, relying on two
conditions found lacking, namely, uniqueness and large proportion.5 8
Since that time, the requirement that personalty be unique as
a prerequisite to an apportionment has not been stressed, the
distinction apparently being abandoned. Apportionment of the
proceeds upon the sale of stock in a closely held corporation was
53285 N.Y. 475, 35 N.E.2d 177 (1941). The chose in action involved
was the right to commissions on renewal insurance premiums.
5474 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
55 Id. at 100. The court did, in fact, apportion the proceeds upon the sale,
but only to the extent that the sales price was enhanced by undeclared
dividends to which the testator intended the life beneficiaries be entitled.
Accord, In the Matter of Kreitner, 187 Misc. 747, 65 N.Y.S.Zd 691 (Surr.
Ct. 1946). But see In the Matter of Estate of Lander, 162 Misc. 201, 294
N.Y. Supp. 58 (Surr. Ct. 1937). The theory of apportionment employed
where earnings are not distributed must be distinguished from the theory
granting apportionment of -the proceeds of unproductive property. See In
the Matter of Estate of Lander, supra at 203, 294 N.Y. Supp. at
61. For a discussion of the theory employed in Ebbets, see 4 BOGERT.
op. cit. supra note 46, § 824.5 6 1n re Ebbet's Will, 74 N.Y.S.2d 94, 98 (Surr. Ct. 1947). The effect
of the court's extension of the uniqueness requirement is somewhat weakened
by the apparent alternate holding that there was no intent to apportion.
Id. at 99.
'l7 I re Rosenwasser's Estate, 74 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Surr. Ct. 1947).5SIn re Bishop's Estate, 79 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Surr. Ct. 1948). "There is
here present no sale of an asset which constituted a major or even a large
fraction of the trust estate and surely there is nothing unique about col-
lateralized defaulted promissory notes or about claims for tax refunds."
Id. at 224. The mere fact that the unproductive asset is a minor item
in the estate will not, of itself, bar apportionment. In re Johnson's Will,
73 N.Y.S.2d 621, 629 (Surr. Ct. 1947) (unproductive real property). Contra,
In the Matter of Estate of Marshall, 136 Misc. 116, 238 N.Y. Supp. 763
(Surr. Ct. 1930) (unproductive real property).
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allowed in In re Cuff's Will,59 and implicitly approved by In re
Godfrey's Will.6° In Godfrey, the court rejected a realty-per-
sonalty distinction, implying that the treatment of unproductive
common stock and unproductive realty should be identical. The
apportionment, however, was refused for lack of an intent for
apportionment, the settlor's indications being to the contrary."'
The apportionment of unproductive common stock was also ap-
proved by implication in Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v.
Brown,62 where the remedy was denied upon a failure to find
unproductiveness rather than upon any distinction between realty
and common stock.6
Payments made in settlement of a claim 4 and proceeds of a
"relatively" unproductive mortgage65 were also apportioned with-
out searching for the element of uniqueness, which in earlier
cases had been the essence of the distinction between realty and
personalty. 66
In Estate of Sheridan,67 discussed earlier, common stocks were
the object of the attempted apportionment. The remaindermen
argued against the apportionment of the proceeds, urging that the
remedy is limited to "real property, choses in action or
tangible personal property of a unique character and only then if
the will evidences an intent that there should be an apportion-
ment." 68 The court allowed the apportionment. However, on a
reargument of the case, the first opinion was withdrawn and the
apportionment denied on the basis of estoppel.
6 9
59 118 N.Y.S.2d 619 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
60 114 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
6 1 Id. at 867.
6230 N.Y.S2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1941).6 3 Id. at 92-93. See In the Matter of Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 256, 97
N.E.2d 888, 892 (1951) (dictum) for further approval of the apportionment
of the proceeds from the sale of common stocks.6 4 In the Matter of Will of Rosenzweig, 4 Misc. 2d 142, 148 N.Y.S.2d
371 (Surr. Ct. 1955), aff'd mem., 7 App. Div. 2d 969, 183 N.Y.S.2d 992
(1st Dep't 1959). In that case, the court not only failed to distinguish
realty from personalty, but allowed the apportionment from the very fact
of unproductiveness without more.
651n re Rosenwasser's Estate, 84 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Surr. Ct. 1948). The
court stressed the presence of an intention to prefer the income beneficiaries.
Id. at 307.
66 See also In the Matter of Becker, 204 Misc. 523, 123 N.Y.S2d 589
(Surr. Ct. 1953), stressing the usual real property requirements, and omitting
mention of a uniqueness test or a personalty distinction. Id. at 532, 123
N.Y.S.2d at 599.
67 146 N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1961, p. 6, col. 8 (Surr. Ct., N.Y. County).6 8 Ibid. It was also urged that the estate of the income beneficiary
was estopped from objecting to the delayed sale as the decedent had been
a co-trustee.
69In re Sheridan's Estate, 222 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Surr. Ct. 1961). The
second opinion did not deny the possibility of apportionment of this type of
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From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the objection
to apportionment based on the character of the asset has been sustained
at best in a sporadic manner. No clear line of authority upholds the
distinction. New York70 and other jurisdictions 71 expressly and
implicitly deny its existence. Authority outside New York, not-
ably England, grants apportionment as readily when dealing with
personalty as with realty,7 2 and both the Restatement of Trusts 7,1
and the Uniform Principal and Income Act 74 fail to distinguish
the two.
No strong theory behind the distinction would appear to exist.
Perhaps the concept of "uniqueness" arose from an attitude that
unless the personalty were unique, there would be a ready market
for it, and therefore no justification for a delay in the conversion.
Under these circumstances, if there were a delay, the remedy
would more likely lie in surcharge rather than in apportionment.
Whatever may have prompted the distinction, and whatever
may be its extent today, it stands on tenuous ground. There can
be no question that both realty and personalty can become unpro-
ductive, and that the monetary loss will not vary with the character
of the asset. In addition, the settlor surely cannot be said to have
intended that a fair return be earned from realty, thereby justifying
a sale and apportionment if it is unproductive, but not if the assets
are personalty.
Since the effect of unproductiveness and the implied intention
of the settlor do not vary with the character of the asset, there
is no reason to impose different standards for the allowance of
the apportionment. The same tests should apply in. both instances,
regardless of the character of the assets, and subject only to
qualifications expressed by or imputed to the settlor.
asset, but left open the question of whether a duty to sell existed. If there
was a duty, the court reasoned that "nothing stood in the way of its dis-
charge except the act or omission of the trustees" which would result in
an estoppel, since the income beneficiary was a co-trustee. Id. at 754.
70 See cases cited notes 52, 59, 60, 64, 65 and 66 supra.
71 See Equitable Trust Co. v. Kent, 11 Del. Cl_. 343, 101 Atl. 875 (Ch.
1917); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Tucker, 52 R.I. 277, 160 Atl. 465(1932); Gate v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 178 Tenn. 249, 156 S.W.2d 812(1941).
72 See Skilton, The Rights of Successive Beneficiaries in Unproductive
Trust Assets Not Bearing Interest, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 241, 258 (1941).
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS ! 241, comment b (1959).
74 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 11. See DODGE & SULLIVAN,
ESTATE ADMINISTRATION AND ACCOUNTING 443 (1940).
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Conclusion
Traditionally, the apportionment remedy had been limited to
totally unproductive realty. The reluctance to expand this remedy
to include unproductive personalty has, at present, been largely
overcome. At the same time, the theory extending apportionment
to underproductive property has received greater extrajudicial ex-
pression and support. It is this latter issue of underproductivity,
however, with which the New York judiciary and the legislature
have been loath to deal, possibly due to the formidable practical
problems asociated with it. The adoption by the courts of a test
which grants apportionment of the proceeds from the sale of
those assets which have become substantially unproductive would
resolve, in a practical and sound manner, the theoretical inconsist-
ency which exists in limiting apportionment to totally unproductive
property.
THE FTC AND TELEVISION:
A NEW RULE FOR MISREPRESENTATION BY TEST
AND DEMONSTRATION
The Federal Trade Commission was established to further
the national interest by preserving and promoting a free enter-
prise economy, the natural development of which was being hampered
because of increasing disregard for ethical conduct in the market
place.' Among the chief armaments available to the Commission
is Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act which renders
unlawful "unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce .... 12 Recently, the
Commission invoked this section and found deceptive a televised
commercial which, in purporting to prove the moistening qualities
of a shaving cream through an actual demonstration of its ability
to soften sandpaper, substituted a mock-up of sand adhered
to plexiglass. While momentarily conceding the product to be
in fact capable of softening sandpaper, the following rule is implied
1 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 717, 15 U.S.C. §41(1958) ; Moore, Deceptive Trade Practices and the Federal Trade Commission,
28 TENN. L. REV. 493, 494 (1961). See Note, The Regulation of Advertising,
56 COLUm. L. REv. 1018, 1019 (1956).2Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938, 52 Stat. 111, 15 U.S.C. §45 (1958).
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